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 espite improving outlook of the Philippine
  economy in the past few months, recent statis-
  tics still show that bank loans have continued
to shrink. The seeming reluctance of banks to lend has
worried policymakers and some analysts because it could
undermine the strength of the economic recovery. In fact,
a lot of people are now ganging up on the banks for not
expanding their loans fast enough to support the expected
economic turnaround, screaming “credit crunch!”
But is there really a credit crunch? If so, what fac-
tors have caused it? These were the questions that the
“Things are seldom what they seem,
Skim milk masquerades as cream.”
Gilbert
H.M.S. Pinafore
Economic Monitoring Group (EMG) attempted to answer
when it called representatives from the business sector,
bankers’ associations and academe to a meeting at the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank) last June 25,
1999. And despite the lack of consensus on the issue
about the existence and causes of a credit crunch since
the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the participants of
said EMG-led meeting then proceeded to put forward
some recommendations to encourage financial institu-
tions to increase the flow of credit to the private sector.
This Policy Notes issue looks back into these ques-
tions tackled by the group and attempts to answer them
based on empirical evidence and analysis. In addition,
the Notes puts forward some suggested policies that
would help to accelerate the recovery of the Philippine
economy.
Credit crunch vs. credit slowdown
A credit crunch is always associated with a decline
in the quantity of credit, but not every decline in the quan-
tity of credit is a credit crunch. Thus, it is necessary to
differentiate the term credit crunch from the term credit
D
————————
*This is based on Lamberte (1999). The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the research assistance provided by Ms. Chelo Manlagnit and Ms.
Hope Gerochi and secretarial assistance by Ms. Juanita Tolentino.
**The author is Acting President of the Institute.2
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slowdown.1 A decline in the quantity of bank loans, which
has been observed, for instance, to have dropped from
P1.4 trillion in June 1998 to P1.3 trillion in June 1999,
might have been induced either by a decline in the sup-
ply or demand for credit or both. The term credit slow-
down is used to refer to the combined effects of both
supply factors and demand considerations on the quan-
tity of credit. On the other hand, the term credit crunch
refers only to a reduction in the available supply of credit.
Thus, a credit crunch is a supply-side phenomenon. A
drop in the quantity of bank loans caused by a decrease
in demand for credit by firms and households due to de-
pressed economic activity is a demand-side phenomenon,
which must not be confused with the term credit crunch.
Indeed, the real challenge lies in distinguishing a
credit slowdown originating from the supply side (credit
crunch) from that coming from the demand side of the
credit market since each type requires a different set of
policy prescriptions. Admittedly, making such distinction
is not easy to do because credit slowdown occurring in
many countries, including the Philippines, has been as-
sociated with economic downturn. In fact, there is still
an ongoing debate about the occurrence of a credit crunch
in those periods marked by credit slowdown in the U.S.
economy. The debate has recently spread to Asia when a
financial crisis hit the region beginning in July 1997.2
Understandably, the competing views have led to differ-
ent policy prescriptions. For example, those who believe
that Asian economies are currently experiencing a credit
crunch argue that traditional monetary tools cannot reli-
ably address cyclical problems when there are severe
disruptions in the credit market that adversely affect eco-
nomic activity. Therefore, monetary authorities must aban-
don the traditional IMF prescriptions and instead use other
tools to influence the credit supply. These may include:
temporary suspension of capital adequacy standards,
provision of credit through nonmarket channels, and un-
limited and unconditional provision of domestic liquidity,
among others.3
According to Cantor and Wenninger (1993), a credit
crunch implies changes in the relationship between credit
availability and interest rates as in:
(a) less credit may be available over a wide range
of interest rates, a condition consistent with a shift in a
credit supply schedule while the credit demand schedule
remains unchanged, or
(b) the reduction in credit availability may bear little
relation to the level of interest rates, a condition that
occurs when banks allocate credit not by the price (i.e.,
interest rate) but through nonprice mechanisms to over-
come the problem of imperfect information and asym-
metric information.
The task, therefore, is to find indicators that can
describe both conditions (a) and (b).
Necessary condition
A necessary condition for the existence of a credit
crunch during a certain period is that the quantity of credit
is contracting. An episode showing a credit crunch may
be seen in a period when the growth rate in the ratio of
bank loans to GDP, or credit ratio for short, becomes
negative for at least two consecutive quarters.
As shown in Figure 1, the growth in the credit ratio
had been declining since the onset of the Asian financial
crisis and had entered the negative territory since the
second quarter of 1998 (right-hand scale). For the sec-
ond quarter of 1999, the credit ratio contracted by 17.6
percent on an annual basis. Thus, the empirical evidence
satisfies the necessary condition for the existence of a
credit crunch beginning in the second quarter of 1998.
However, before this situation is accepted as a credit
crunch episode, a corroborating evidence or sufficient
condition—in addition to the necessary condition—must
still be satisfied.
————————
1Most of the terms in this paper are drawn from Bernanke (1993)
and Cantor and Wenninger (1993).
2See Lamberte et al. (1999), Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999), Ding
et al. (1998), and Waiquamdee et al. (1999).




What may be considered as a corroborating piece
of evidence? Four conditions were examined by this au-
thor in considering a possible corroborating piece of evi-
dence, namely:
] Real lending rate must be rising during a credit
crunch episode. This is because a drying up in the sup-
ply of bank loans, with demand for bank credit remaining
unchanged, can lead to a rise in interest rate.
] The spread between loans and risk-free assets
must be widening during a credit crunch episode. This is
because banks may be reluctant to lend during periods
when risks are perceived to be rising. Such behavior can
be reflected in the spread between their lending rate and
the rate of return on less risky investment instruments
such as the treasury bills.
] Bank intermediation spread must be widening
during a credit crunch episode. A tightening in regulatory
standards such as the use of stricter criteria for deter-
mining past due loans and the imposition of a general
loan-loss provision can reduce banks’ willingness to lend,
even to some of their creditworthy customers. In such a
situation, banks will likely bid less aggressively for de-
posits, and perhaps maintain or raise their lending rate,
resulting in the widening of the bank intermediation
spread, i.e., the difference between lending and deposit
rates.
] Credit rationing is intensified by banks during a
credit crunch episode. It is widely believed that banks
practice credit rationing; that is, they allocate credit not
by the price of credit, i.e., interest rate, but through
nonprice mechanisms. This is due to asymmetry in infor-
mation wherein borrowers have more information about
their creditworthiness than banks. A credit crunch may
arise from an aggravation of information asymmetry, es-
pecially during periods of economic uncertainty, which
leads banks to tighten credit rationing.
Figure 1. Growth Rates of Commercial Bank Loans (as % of GDP),
Real Lending Rates, Spread between Lending Rates and 91-day T-bill
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The first three are indicators for condition(a) while
the fourth is for condition(b). The existence of any of these
four corroborating pieces of evidence is a sufficient con-
dition for the occurrence of a credit crunch.
To find out whether there is really a credit crunch in
the country today, this Notes therefore looked at macro
level data to see if the first
three possible corroborat-
ing pieces of evidence hold
water while firm-level data
were used to check if the
fourth exists.
Looking back at Figure
1, we note that it also de-
picts the behavior of the
real lending rate, the spread
between lending and the
91-day Treasury bill rates
and the intermediation
spread from the first quar-
ter of 1997 to the second
quarter of 1999 (left-hand
scale). Based on the move-
ments of these three vari-
ables, we can see that they4
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do not exhibit a pattern as expected in any
of the first three conditions cited above that
could serve as corroborating evidence for
the existence of a credit crunch. More spe-
cifically, they tended to decline during the
period when the credit ratio had been con-
tracting. As such, one can conclude that
none of the three sufficient conditions for
the existence of a credit crunch has been
satisfied.
In terms of the fourth condition, mean-
while, two types of credit rationing were
examined. One is pure rationing, which oc-
curs when some borrowers are denied
credit while otherwise identical borrowers receive credit.
The results of a recent survey of a sample of 541 firms
show that the proportion of firms denied of bank credit
rose from 6.4 percent before the onset of the Asian cri-
sis to 13 percent during the Asian financial crisis (Table
1). However, although the proportion has doubled during
the crisis period, it is still much smaller than what is
generally expected considering the economic uncertainty
brought about by the Asian currency meltdown. In other
words, a great majority of the sample firms still have
continued access to credit from a bank or finance com-
pany during the crisis period.
Moreover, before admitting that an intensification
of pure credit rationing occurs, it is important to find out
if banks have a good basis for denying the loan applica-
tions of some firms during the crisis period. Heavy debt
exposure of firms could be one of the reasons. The sur-
vey results show that the average debt-equity ratio of
those firms being denied of bank loans increased from 3
in 1996 to 5.1 during the first half of 1998, whereas the
debt-equity ratio of firms that were able to access bank
credit declined from 3.5 to 2.7 in the same period. This
means that banks were able to sort out the risky from
the less risky borrowers on the basis of their customers’
debt exposure. These results do not lend support to the
view that there has been an intensification of pure credit
rationing in the recent past brought about by information
asymmetry.
The other type of credit rationing is sectoral ration-
ing, which refers to the application of credit standards
that effectively shut off the flow of credit to entire sec-
tors such as certain classes of borrowers or types of
borrowing. During periods of economic uncertainty ac-
companied by sharp currency depreciation, banks are
likely to discriminate against small firms and non-export-
ers and favor large firms and exporters. However, the
survey data presented in Table 1 do not support this
view. As shown, the proportion of exporters denied of
bank loans during the crisis period had increased more
than that of nonexporters (beginning vs. end period).4 In
terms of size, both small and large firms saw a doubling
in the proportion of firms denied of bank loans during
the indicated period.
What do the results say?
As discussed, the above results do not confirm the
existence of a credit crunch during the crisis period.
————————
4There is anecdotal evidence that some exporters ran into financial
trouble right after the sharp depreciation in the peso in July 1997 be-
cause they contracted dollar-denominated loans to finance their non-
exporting businesses.
Table 1. Enterprises Denied of Bank Loans
(In percent)
A. Export orientation
1. Exporters 6.61 11.98 14.34
2. Nonexporters 6.28 12.56 11.61
B. By size of firms
1. Small 5.24 8.66 11.16
2. Large 7.56 15.68 14.77
C. Total 6.42 12.21 12.98
Source: Survey of Philippine Industry and the Financial Crisis, 1998
January 1- July 1- So far
June 30, 1997 December 31, 1997 in 19985
Policy Notes
No. 99-08
Rather, it is argued here that the decline in the quantity
of bank loans in the most recent past can be mainly at-
tributed to the decrease in the demand for credit due to
the economic downturn. First, economic growth rate al-
ready slowed down even before the Asian financial crisis
hit the Philippines. More specifically, after peaking at 6.1
percent in the second quarter of 1996, GDP growth rate
declined in the subsequent quarters. Second, the aver-
age capacity utilization of the 541 firms surveyed de-
clined from 78 percent in 1996 to 69 percent during the
first half of 1998. It is worthy to note that capacity utili-
zation rate already declined to 75 percent during the first
half of 1997. All these could have affected the firms’
demand for credit in the most recent period.
A causality test was further performed to determine
whether weaknesses in bank loans caused or led to a
recession or vice-versa, using quarterly data on bank loans
and real GDP growth rate from the first quarter of 1982
to the second quarter of 1999. The results of the causal-
ity tests suggest that declines/increases in GDP growth
rate preceded or caused the declines/increases in bank
loans during the period being considered, not the other
way around as many have expected.
is higher among firms that do not have loans than among
those that have existing loans. In both cases, a smaller
proportion of exporters and large firms are facing liquid-
ity constraint than non-exporters and small firms. How-
ever, the liquidity constraint facing these firms is expected
to ease up as demand for goods picks up because the
results of the same survey mentioned above show that
income from sales covers 36 percent of the short-term
financing requirement and 38 percent of the long-term
financing requirement of firms.
Conclusions and policy implications
The results of this study generally do not support
the claim that the country has been facing a credit crunch
in the sense defined above since the onset of the Asian
financial crisis. On the contrary, they tend to show that
the current slowdown in bank loans is merely a reflection
of the recession. Therefore, bank loans are expected to
rebound following a resurgence in economic activity. This
should serve as a warning to those who want to push
banks to loosen up a notch in their lending policy, which
may endanger the sustainability of the economic recov-
ery. After all, it was not very long ago when almost every
one was blaming the aggressive lending stance of banks
for the present economic crisis. At the very least, pru-
dential measures that were recently put in place by the
Bangko Sentral must be maintained.
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What to expect in the near term
Given such results, it is expected that growth in
bank loans will lag behind
GDP growth in the next few
quarters. In other words,
GDP growth will enter the
positive territory before
growth in bank loans does.
Are the firms hard
pressed for funds? The sur-
vey results show that about
three-fourths of the total
sample firms claimed to
have adequate liquidity to
finance production. The pro-
portion claiming the same6
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In terms of macroeconomic policy, policymakers
should concentrate on raising aggregate demand. Both
monetary and fiscal policies should support this stance.
However, there is a limit as to how much monetary policy
can push aggregate demand. Since monetary policy has
already been substantially relaxed in recent months, it
must now take a neutral stance. Raising interest rate to
defend the exchange rate must be avoided, especially
since there is a reason for allowing the nominal exchange
rate to depreciate. Figure 2 shows that the Philippines’
real effective exchange rate has recently returned to its
pre-crisis level, suggesting that the peso has been ap-
preciating in real terms in recent months. It likewise shows
that the Philippines has been losing its international com-
petitiveness to its neighbors in recent months-—a bad
news to both the country’s domestic- and export-oriented
industries. Exports, which are a major component of ag-
gregate demand, need to be sustained during the recov-
ery period. Likewise, domestic-oriented industries, which
are not enjoying anymore protection from tariff, must be
given a fair deal by avoiding an overvaluation of the peso.
The other reason for maintaining a low interest rate is to
allow loan work-outs done by some firms and banks to
proceed in a less costly and orderly manner.
On the other hand, fiscal policy must remain expan-
sionary for the rest of the year. Indeed, the government
announced last year a set of pump-priming measures for
this year. There are, however, some doubts as to whether
real pump-priming measures have been effectively acti-
vated this year. The budget figures net of accounts
payables seem to suggest that fiscal policy has not taken
a strong expansionary stance after all. Whether the re-
cent bulge in accounts payables is purely technical in
nature (i.e., due to accounting and auditing procedures)
or is a result of an attempt by the past administration to
use it as a fiscal instrument needs to be seriously exam-
ined. Next year, however, it may not be prudent on the
part of the government to implement pump-priming mea-
sures.  4
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